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NOTES
How We Should Think About the
Constitutional Status of the Suspected
Terrorist Detainees at Guantanamo
Bay:
Examining
Theories
that
Interpret the Constitution's Scope
ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the United
States has held suspected terrorist detainees captured during
the military campaign in Afghanistan indefinitely at the United
States military facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Among
those currently detained are members of the al-Qaeda terrorist
group and the Taliban. Currently the detainees are in the
peculiar situation of generally being outside the scope of
protections offered by both the internationalhumanitarianlaw
and the Unites States criminal law regimes.
This Note examines the extraterritorialscope of the United
States Constitution as it applies to the suspected terrorist
detainees at Guantanamo Bay. It argues that the difficult
questions concerning how to define the detainees' constitutional
status cannot be answered by courts employing a formalistic
analysis that characterizes the issue as one governed by the
notion of sovereignty. Instead, a more substantive approach is
warranted that examines theories used to interpret the
Constitution's scope. After discussing these theories, this Note
proposes that the textured membership theory provides a useful
approach in determining the Constitution's extraterritorial
scope as it pertains to the Guantanamodetainees.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On September 11, 2001, terrorists launched an attack on the
United States that killed thousands of Americans.' Shortly following
the attacks, the United States, acting with allied forces, launched air
strikes against Afghanistan. 2 In the midst of the ground campaign

1.

Elisabeth Bumiller, Vigilance and Memory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2002, at

BS.
2.
Stephen Castle, Air Strikes on Afghanistan: Coalition-KeyAllies Rally to
Support US-Led Military Response, INDEP. (London), Oct. 8, 2001, at 5.

2003]

STATUS OF GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

that followed the air campaign, allied forces captured a number of
suspected terrorists. 3 Those captured included suspected members of
the al-Qaeda terrorist group as well as members of Afghanistan's
former Taliban leadership. 4 These individuals were eventually
transferred to the United States military facility at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, where they have received indefinite detention.
The United States has determined that although the Taliban
detainees are entitled to receive the protections of the Third Geneva
Convention, they are ineligible to receive prisoner-of-war status. 5 The
United States has also maintained that the al-Qaeda detainees are
not entitled to receive the protections of the Third Geneva
Convention, and by implication, are not eligible to receive prisoner-ofwar status. 6 Moreover, some federal courts in the United States have
held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine the
constitutionality of the detentions. 7 These decisions have left the
detainees in the peculiar situation of generally being outside the
scope of protections offered in the two legal regimes that would
typically govern their status.
This Note examines the extraterritorial scope of the U.S.
Constitution as it applies to the suspected terrorist detainees at
Guantanamo Bay. Following the introduction, Section II provides a
discussion detailing the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks.
Section III addresses the two legal regimes available to the United
States through which it can extend protections to the detainees.
Specifically, this section will discuss the Third Geneva Conventions
and its relevant provisions concerning prisoners of war. It will
address how the United States has defined the status of the detainees
and what that status means insofar as receiving protections from the
Convention. Moreover, this section will focus on how federal courts
have concluded that constitutional protections afforded to individuals
in the criminal law context do not apply to the detainees currently
located at Guantanamo Bay. Central to this discussion will be an
examination of the notion of sovereignty and its ambiguous nature.
Section IV contains a general discussion addressing theories that
have attempted to interpret the scope of the Constitution and how the

3.
See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to InternationalLaw, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 475 (2002) (providing background on the
legal status of the Guantanamo detainees).
4.
Castle, supranote 2, at 5.
5.
White House Fact Sheet on Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7,
2002),
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/O2/2002020713.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
6.
Id.
7.
See generally Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal.
2002); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub. nom. Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S.
Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-0334); Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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Supreme Court treated some of these theories in one of its decisions.
Section V discusses an alternative conceptualization of one theory
that is rooted in the notion of membership. This Note proposes that
the approach offered by the textured membership theory serves as a
useful guide in assessing the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution
with respect to the Guantanamo detainees that avoids the flaws that
are apparent in its more restrictive counterpart. Finally, Section VI
offers a conclusion.
II.BACKGROUND
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four airplanes and
executed the deadliest attacks against the United States since the
Civil War.8 Two of the planes crashed into the World Trade Center,
another directly hit the Pentagon, and the final one crashed into a
field in Pennsylvania.9 Over three thousand people lost their lives as
a result of the attacks.' 0 Almost immediately afterwards, U.S.
officials held Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist network
responsible.11 In the wake of the devastation, President Bush
declared a national emergency. 12 He emphasized that the attacks
were "not acts of terrorism but acts of war. 13 As a response to them,
the United States, acting in conjunction with allied forces, launched
air strikes against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.14
During the ensuing military campaign, allied forces captured
many suspected members of al-Qaeda and individuals associated with
Afghanistan's former Taliban leadership. 15 President Bush's Military
Order of November 13, 2001, provided that such individuals would be
16
detained, and when tried, would face trial by military tribunals.

8.
The New Enemy, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 2001, at 15, available at
LEXIS, News and Business Library, The Economist File.

9.
10.

Id.
Michael Tackett, With Grief and Resolve, U.S. Pauses to Remember, CHI.

TRIB., Sept. 12, 2002, at 1.
11.
Richard Beeston, Bin Laden Heads List of Suspects, TIMES (London), Sept.
12, 2001, available at LEXIS, News and Business Library, Major World Publications
File.
12.
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Military Order].
13.
The New Enemy, supra note 8, at 16.
14.
Castle, supra note 2, at 5.
15.
See Murphy, supra note 3, at 475.
16.
Section 1(e) of the Military Order provides:
(e) To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective conduct of
military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary for
individuals subject to this order pursuant to section 2 hereof to be detained,
and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and other
applicable laws by military tribunals.
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The Order specifically gave the Secretary of Defense authority to use
all means necessary to ensure that persons subject to the order were
detained and, if applicable, tried by a military commission. 17 The
Order also provided a broad definition of persons subject to it: its
provisions could potentially apply to any individual who lacked U.S.
citizenship.' 8 Under the Order, rules of evidence that normally
applied in criminal trials were not to be used in trials by military
19
commissions.
At the beginning of January 2002, twenty captured individuals
20
were transferred to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
This number soon rose to 300 by the end of February. 2 1 By November
2002, there were approximately 625 detainees held at the naval
base. 22 Soon after the first detainees arrived at Guantanamo,
concerns were raised by foreign governments, human rights groups,
and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights as to whether
the detainees were receiving adequate treatment under international
law.2 3 Reports received by Amnesty International indicated that the
detainees were shackled, hooded, and sedated during transfer, had
their beards forcibly shaved, and were housed in small cages not

Military Order,supra note 12, § 1(e) at 57,834.
Id. §§ 2(a),(b) at 57, 834-35.
17.
Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying
18.
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1263 (2002). Section 2(a) defines the
persons subject to the Order and reads in pertinent part:
(a)

The term "individual subject to this order" shall mean any individual who
is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I determine from time
to time in writing that:
(1)

there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times,

(i)

is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;

(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore, that have
caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or
adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security,
foreign policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in
subparagraphs (i) or of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and
(2)

it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to
this order.

Military Order,supra note 12, § 2(a) at 57, 834.
Military Order,supra note 12, §1(f) at 57, 833.
19.
20.
Murphy, supra note 3, at 475.
21.
Id.
22.
Susan Schmidt & Bradley Graham, Military Trial Plans Nearly Done,
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2002, at A10.
23.
Murphy, supra note 3, at 475.
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providing substantial protection from external conditions.2 4 Detainees
at Guantanamo continue to be held and interrogated without access
to lawyers or members of their families.2 5 The length of time the
prisoners spend at Guantanamo is also in limbo, as the
Administration has noted that the detainees may be held indefinitely
without trial. 26 Moreover, the Administration has further added that
even persons who are acquitted by military commissions will remain
27
detained indefinitely if they are considered dangerous.
In general, there are two legal regimes through which the United
States can provide protections to the suspected terrorist detainees.
The first is comprised of protections included in international
humanitarian law and specifically embodied in the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions contain provisions

addressing the wounded and sick of the armed forces while on the
field, 28 armed forces at sea, 29 prisoners of war,3 0 and civilians during
wartime.3 1 U.S. criminal law also provides constitutional safeguards
that the federal government must apply to those individuals who are
suspected of committing crimes. These safeguards include the habeas
clause3 2 and the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments3 3 of the
United States Constitution. In the context of the Guantanamo
detainees, general concerns over their treatment prompted discussion
regarding their specific legal status.3 4 Questions have arisen as to
whether the protections listed in Article 4 of the Convention Relative
3 5
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention)

24.
Amnesty International, Al Calls on the USA to End Legal Limbo of
Guantanamo Prisoners, (Jan. 15, 2002), available at http://web.amnesty.org/web/
content.nsf/pages/gbrsep1lcrisis (last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
25.
Neely Tucker, Detainees Seek Access to Courts, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2002, at
A22.
26.
Amnesty International, Memorandum to the US Government on the Rights
of People in US Custody in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, (April 15, 2002),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/web/content.nsf/pages/gbrsepllcrisis (last visited
Nov. 19, 2002).
27.
Katherine Q. Seelye, Pentagon Says Acquittals May Not Free Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al.
28.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
29.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85.
30.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
31.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
32.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.2
33.
U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI.
34.
Murphy, supra note 3, at 476.
35.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 30.
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were applicable to the detainees. 36 Lawsuits have also been brought
in the federal courts to determine whether the detainees could secure
37
specific protections enumerated in the U.S. Constitution.
III. Two

LEGAL REGIMES GOVERNING THE STATUS OF THE SUSPECTED
TERRORIST DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY

A. Applicability of the Third Geneva Convention to the Detainees
1. Provisions of the Third Geneva Convention
The four Geneva Conventions were created in 1949 as a reaction
to the events following World War 11.38 The Conventions reflected an
attempt by the international community to create universal rules to
protect victims of war. 39 The four conventions were signed by 188
nations and are accepted by almost the entire international
community. 40 The Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War was one of these four conventions. 4 1 It defines what persons
are prisoners of war and lists a number of protections that are to be
provided to such persons. 42 The provisions of the Convention apply in
all instances of war or armed conflict between two states that are
parties to the agreement. 43 It also applies in situations where there is
partial or total occupation of a member state irrespective of whether
the specific occupation meets any armed resistance. 44 All member
states are bound by the provisions of the Convention regardless of
whether other states in a conflict are parties that abide by the
45
Convention.
Provisions detailing what persons constitute prisoners of war are
found in Article 4 of the Third Convention. There are a number of
categories that confer prisoner-of-war status to those persons in

36.
Murphy, supra note 3, at 476.
37.
See generally Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal.
2002); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub. nom. Al Odah v.
United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S.
Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-0334); Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
38.
Major Timothy C. MacDonnell, Military Commissions and Courts-Martial:
A Brief Discussion of the Constitutional and JurisdictionalDistinctions Between the
Two Courts, 2002 ARMY LAW. 19, 30 (2002).
39.
Id.
40.
Chen Reis, Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of
Prosecuting Children for Participatingin Internal Armed Conflict, 28 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 629, 640 (1997).
41.
MacDonnell, supranote 38, at 30.
42.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 30, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3517, 75
U.N.T.S. at 136.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
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enemy custody. 4 6 Members of the armed forces of a party to the
conflict and members of militias or volunteer corps that form part of
the armed forces are given prisoner-of-war status under the
Convention. 47 Prisoner-of-war status is also conferred to members of
other militias as well as members of other volunteer corps, including
organized resistance movements that belong to a party to the conflict
and that are commanded by an individual responsible for his
subordinates; have a fixed distinctive sign that can be recognized at a
distance; openly carry arms; and conduct their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war.4 8 Article 4 protections
also extend to members of the regular armed forces maintaining
allegiance to a government or authority not recognized by a
"detaining power," civilians who are authorized to accompany the
armed forces, members of crews who are not benefited by more
favorable treatment under any other provision of international law,
and inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who spontaneously take
49
arms in resistance of invading forces.

46.

Article 4(A) of the Third Geneva Convention provides in pertinent part:

A.

Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the
power of the enemy:
(1)

Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces.

(2)

Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory,
even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements,
fulfill the following conditions:

(3)

(a)

that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;

(b)

that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable
distance;

(c)

that of carrying arms openly;

(d)

that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.

at a

Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power ....

Third Geneva Convention, supra note 30, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3517-19, 75 U.N.T.S. at
138-40.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
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Article 5 states that the provisions in the Convention will apply
to all prisoners of war from the time they are taken into the power of
50
the enemy until they receive their final release and repatriation.
Additionally, Article 5 contains mechanisms to address ambiguities
over whether a person falls under any of the Article 4 categories. 51 In
the case of any such ambiguity, Article 5 provides that persons will
continue to receive the protections listed in the Convention until a
52
competent tribunal determines their status.
2.
The U.S. Administration's
Convention

Treatment of the Third Geneva

Following the transfer of suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban
members to Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. Administration proceeded in
determining what legal status these individuals possessed. Initially,
the Administration classified both groups of detainees as "unlawful
combatants" who were not entitled to the protections listed in the
Third Geneva Convention, yet were still afforded humane
treatment. 53 With respect to the Taliban, some members in the U.S.
government argued that Afghanistan ceased to be a party to the
Third Geneva Convention since it was not a functioning state during
the allied campaign and since the Taliban was not recognized as the
legitimate government of the country. 54 Therefore, by implication, the
provisions of the Third Geneva Convention could not apply to the
Taliban members captured and transferred to Guantanamo Bay.
Some officials in the government also argued that the members of alQaeda were similarly not to receive any protections under the Third
Geneva Convention. 55 Their rationale was that the organization did
not constitute a state, the campaign in Afghanistan was not an
internal conflict and therefore Article 3 could not afford them any
protections, and the members of the organization failed to meet the

50.

Article 5 provides that:

The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4
from the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release
and repatriation.
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of
the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection
of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined
by a competent tribunal.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 30, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3519-21, 75 U.N.T.S. at
140-42.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
Murphy, supra note 3, at 476-77.
54.
Id. at 477.
55.
Id.
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requirements under Article 4(a)(2) of the Convention. 56 This
formulation therefore denied the detainees prisoner-of-war status
57
under Article 4 of the Third Convention.
Responding to criticism from
European
allies
and
recommendations from some members within the government, the
United States later modified its position with respect to the Taliban
detainees and stated that captured members of the Taliban would
receive protections contained in the Third Geneva Convention. 58
Secretary of State Colin Powell asked President Bush to reconsider
his position and noted that the United Nations recognized
Afghanistan as a state during the allied campaign and that the Third
Geneva Convention prisoner-of-war protections applied to the Taliban
forces since they constituted regular armed forces whose allegiance
was with a government not recognized by the United States. 59

Secretary Powell also argued that a "competent tribunal" should
determine the status of each detainee under Article 5 of the
Convention. 60 Officials in the military supported Secretary Powell's
views and were concerned that by denying the protections of the
Convention to the detainees, the government would be creating a
61
precedent that may adversely affect U.S. soldiers captured in war.
Specifically, these concerns were centered on the prospect of foreign
governments not affording a certain level of protections to such
soldiers. 62 Therefore, on February 7, 2002, President Bush announced
that captured members of the Taliban were entitled to the protections
of the Third Geneva Convention because
the nation of Afghanistan
63
was still a party to the Convention.
President Bush, however, also determined that he would not
extend prisoner-of-war status to the Taliban detainees. 64 This official
announcement lacked the specific reasons why the Taliban detainees
were not entitled to prisoner-of-war status. 65 Other members in the
Administration did, however, provide some of the rationale
underlying the decision. 66 For instance, Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld, noted that the Taliban did not meet the requirements of

56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Id
61.
Katherine Q. Seelye & David E. Sanger, Bush Reconsiders Stand on
Treating Captives of War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2002, at Al.
62.
Id.
63.
Fact Sheet, supra note 5.

64.

Id.

65.

Murphy, supra note 3, at 479.

66.

Id.

20031

STA TUS OF GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

1589

Article 4(a)(2) and were closely coordinated with al-Qaeda. 67
Additionally, U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues
Pierre-Richard Prosper further elaborated on the reasons for the U.S.
position:
[W]e have concluded that the Geneva Conventions do apply, however,
to the Taliban leaders who sponsored terrorism. But, a careful analysis
through the lens of the Geneva Convention leads us to the conclusion
that the Taliban detainees do not meet the legal criteria under Article 4
of the convention which would have entitled them to POW status. They
are not under a responsible command. They do not conduct their
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. They do not
have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable from a distance. And they do
not carry their arms openly. Their conduct and history of attacking
civilian populations, disregarding human life and conventional norms,
and promoting barbaric philosophies represents firm proof of their
denied status. But regardless of their inhumanity, they too have the
68
right to be treated humanely.

Despite the change of policy with respect to the status of the
Taliban detainees, the Administration maintained that it would not
extend the protections of the Third Geneva Conventions to the alQaeda detainees. 69 By implication, the al-Qaeda detainees were also
ineligible to receive prisoner-of-war status under the Convention. In
announcing the Administration's position, Ari Fleischer, the White
House Spokesman at the time, stated that al-Qaeda was an
70
international terrorist group and was not a party to the treaty.
Fleischer also noted that the nature of global security threats had
vastly changed since the inception of the Convention, saying that "the
war on terrorism is a war not envisaged when the Geneva Convention
was signed in 1949."71 Ambassador Prosper, in explaining the
Administration's position, further added:
These aggressors initiated a war that under international law they
have no legal right to wage. The right to conduct armed conflict, lawful
belligerency, is reserved only to states and recognized armed forces or
groups under responsible command. Private persons lacking the basic
indicia of organization or the ability and willingness to conduct
operations in accordance with the laws of armed conflict have no legal
right to wage warfare against a state. The members of al Qaida fail to
meet the criteria to be lawful combatants under the law of war. In
choosing to violate these laws and customs of war and engage in

67.
U.S. Dep't of Defense News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability
en Route to Camp X-Ray (Jan. 27, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Jan2002/t01282002_t0127sd2.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
68.
Pierre.Richard Prosper, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues,
Status and Treatment of Taliban and al-Qaida Detainees, Remarks at Chatham House,
London, United Kingdom (Feb. 20, 2002) available at http://www.state.gov/s/wci
rm12002/8491.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2003).
69.
Fact Sheet, supra note 5.
70.
Katherine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban
Captives, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al.
71.
Id.
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hostilities, they-become unlawful combatants. And their conduct, in
intentionally targeting and killing civilians in a time of international
armed conflict, constitute war crimes. As we have repeatedly stated,
these were not ordinary domestic crimes, and the perpetrators cannot
'7 2
and should not be deemed to be ordinary "common criminals.

The United States has maintained that all of the detainees at
Guantanamo are receiving and will continue to receive humane
treatment "to the extent appropriate and consistent with military
necessity, [and] in a manner consistent with the principles of the
Third Geneva Convention." 7 3 Although neither the Taliban nor the alQaeda detainees were entitled P.O.W. privileges, the Administration
stated that as a matter of policy they would be provided with many of
those privileges. 74 For instance, all of the detainees would receive a
diet that complied with Muslim dietary law, medical care, clothing,
shelter, sanitary facilities, an opportunity to worship, the ability to
send mail, and the ability to receive packages subject to a security
screening. 75 Detainees will also not be subjected to abuse or cruel
treatment. 76 The P.O.W. privileges the detainees would not receive
included access to a canteen to buy food, soap, and tobacco, a monthly
pay advance, an opportunity to have and consult financial
accountants, and the ability to receive scientific equipment, musical
instruments, or sports outfits. 77 The Administration justified this
policy noting that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay constituted a
security risk to not only those individuals who guarded them, but also
7
to each other. 8
B. Withholding ConstitutionalProtectionsfrom the Detainees and
Issues of Sovereignty
1. Federal Courts' Decisions to Withhold Constitutional Protections
from the Detainees
Three recent cases have involved efforts to secure certain
constitutional protections for the detainees located at Guantanamo
Bay. 79 Coalition of Clergy v. Bush involved a group of individuals

72.
73.

Prosper, supra note 68.
Fact Sheet, supra, note 5.

74.

Id.

75.
76.

Id.
Id.

77.

Id.

78.
Id. ("Some of these individuals demonstrated how dangerous they are in
uprisings in Mazar-e-Sharif and in Pakistan. The United States must take into account
the need for security in establishing the conditions for detention at Guantanamo.").
79.
See generally Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal.
2002); Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub. nom. Al Odah v.
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entitled the "Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and' Professors" who filed a
petition to secure a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of the detainees
located at Guantanamo Bay in the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California.8" The group alleged that the detainees were
deprived of their liberty without due process, were not informed of the
nature and cause of the accusations made against them, and were not
given legal counsel.8 1 On February 21, 2002, the district court held
that it did not have the jurisdiction to hear the claims forwarded by
the Coalition.8 2 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated that conclusion
and noted that since the Coalition lacked the necessary standing to
bring a habeas petition, it was not necessary for the district court to
whether it could assert jurisdiction
entertain questions regarding
83
over the Coalition's claims.
In Rasul v. Bush, a group of aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay
8 4
filed an action claiming that their detention was unconstitutional.
The petitioners included an Australian citizen allegedly living in
Afghanistan when captured, two citizens of the United Kingdom who
traveled to Pakistan and were later transferred to U.S. control, and
the families of twelve Kuwaiti nationals who were allegedly in
Afghanistan and Pakistan performing humanitarian work. 85 The
primary issue in Rasul was whether individual aliens located outside
the sovereign territory of the United States could use U.S. courts to
assert claims under the Constitution.8 6 The U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia held that because Guantanamo Bay was
located outside the sovereign territory of the United States, it could
not assert jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' claims.8 7 In reaching
decision in
this conclusion, the court noted that the Supreme Court's
89
88
Johnson v. Eisentrager was controlling on the issue.
In Eisentrager, twenty-one German nationals sought a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus from the District Court for the District of
Columbia.9" These individuals alleged that they belonged to the
German armed forces in China. 91 They were convicted of violating the
laws of war by engaging in continued military activity against the

United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S.
Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-0334); Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
Murphy, supra note 3, at 481.
80.
Coalitionof Clergy, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
81.
Id. at 1044.
82.
Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1164 (9th Cir 2002).
83.
Rasul, 215 F.Supp. 2d at 57.
84.
85.
Id. at 57-61.
Id. at 56.
86.
Id. at 72-73.
87.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
88.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
89.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765.
90.
Id.
91.

1592

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36.1579

United States following Germany's surrender, but before the
surrender of Japan in World War 11.92 A U.S. military commission in
China sitting with the consent of the Chinese Government convicted
the twenty-one prisoners. 93 The prisoners were then repatriated to
Germany where they served their sentences at the Landsberg
Prison. 94 Their custodian was an officer of the U.S. Army under the
Commanding General, Third United States Army and the
Commanding General, European Command. 95 The petition filed
alleged that the individuals were denied rights under Articles I and
III of the Constitution, their Fifth Amendment right to due process,
other rights under the Constitution and U.S. law, and the protections
96
provided under the Third Geneva Convention.
Justice Jackson, in writing the opinion for the Court, began by
discussing the distinctions between both citizens and aliens and
friendly and enemy aliens. 97 Citizenship, Justice Jackson noted,
provides a person the opportunity to present claims to the
government for protection.98 With respect to aliens, Justice Jackson
noted that "the alien, to whom the United States has been
traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending
scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society."9 9 This
scale begins with certain rights provided through an alien's lawful
presence in the country that expand and are more secure when an
alien intends to become a citizen and further expand to include all the
rights consistent with citizenship upon an alien's naturalization. 100
The justification for extending constitutional protections beyond the
citizenry was rooted in the alien's presence within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, giving the Court the power to
act. 10 1 The Court therefore noted that "a lawful residence in the
country implies protection, and a capacity to sue and be sued. A
contrary doctrine would be repugnant to sound policy, no less than to
justice and humanity.' 0 2 Justice Jackson clearly noted that a
nonresident enemy alien does not have qualified access to U.S. courts,
92.
93.

Id. at 766.
Id.

94.

Id.

95.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 766.
96.
Id. at 767.
97.
Id. at 769.
98.
See id. ("Citizenship as a head of jurisdiction and a ground of protection
was old when Paul invoked it in his appeal to Caesar. The years have not destroyed nor
diminished the importance of citizenship nor have they sapped the vitality of a citizen's
claims upon his government for protection."); see also Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 65-66
(discussing Jackson's opinion in Eisentrager).
99.
Id. at 770.
100.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 770-71.
101.

Id.

102.

Id. at 776 (quoting Clarke v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 72 (N.Y. 1813)).
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"for he neither has comparable claims upon our institutions nor could
10 3
his use of them fail to be helpful to the enemy."'
Applying these considerations to the twenty-one German
prisoners, Justice Jackson first made the observation that there were
no cases where a court in the United States or in any other country
recognizing the notion of the writ issued a writ on behalf of an alien
enemy who had at no time been within the court's territorial
jurisdiction. 10 4 Moreover, Justice Jackson stated that there was no
support in the text of the Constitution or in any statutes that
supported issuing a writ under the above circumstances. 10 5 With
respect to the twenty-one prisoners, Justice Jackson noted that:
[wie are here confronted with a decision whose basic premise is that
these prisoners are entitled, as a constitutional right, to sue in some
court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus. To support that
assumption we must hold that a prisoner of our military authorities is
constitutionally entitled to the writ, even though he (a) is an enemy
alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was
captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a
prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission
sitting outside the United States; (e)for offenses against the laws of
war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all times
10 6
imprisoned outside the United States.

The issue of sovereignty played a central role in Jackson's discussion.
On this issue, Jackson specifically noted:
We have pointed out that the privilege of litigation has been extended
to aliens, whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their
presence in the country implied protection. No such basis can be
invoked here, for these prisoners at no relevant time were within any
territory over which the United States is sovereign, and the
circumstances of their offense, their capture, their trial and their
punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of
10 7
the United States.

Therefore, Justice Jackson concluded that the German nationals
could not invoke the power of the federal district court to issue the
writ.108
The petitioners in the Rasul case attempted to distinguish their
situation from those of the prisoners in Eisentrager,arguing that the
German nationals' status as enemy aliens was determined by a
military commission, whereas the petitioners had yet to receive such
a determination.1 0 9 The district court, however, noted that the critical
issue in Eisentrager was not a determination of status as an enemy

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 768.
Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 768.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 777-78.
Id. at 781.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 66.
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alien, but rather whether the situs from which the alien was
imprisoned was within the sovereignty of the United States. 110
Moreover, the district court also cited later Supreme Court decisions
reinforcing that position."'
Applying the Eisentrager considerations to the Guantanamo
detainees, the district court first noted that all of the parties in the
lawsuit conceded that Guantanamo Bay was not included within the
sovereign territory of the United States. 112 This conclusion was based
on a lease agreement entered into between the United States and
Cuba in 1903.113 The lease specifically provides:
While on the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance of
the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above
described areas of land and water, on the other hand the Republic of
Cuba consents that during the period of occupation by the United
States of said areas under the terms of this agreement the United
States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within
said areas with the right to acquire . . . for the public purposes of the
United States any land or other property therein by purchase or by
exercise of eminent domain with full compensation to the owners
thereof.114

In a footnote, the court stated the above language clearly showed that
the United States does not maintain sovereignty over the base at
Guantanamo Bay. 115 The court then had to decide whether the
existence of this fact alone barred it from issuing the writ of habeas
corpus, or whether the detainees on Guantanamo are nonetheless
within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. under the theory of de
facto sovereignty. 1 16 The petitioners argued that under a theory of de
facto sovereignty, even though the United States did not maintain de
jure sovereignty over the base at Guantanamo, it could still assert
sovereignty because of the unique nature of the control and
117
jurisdiction that the United States maintained over the base.
Therefore, according to the petitioners, the decision in Eisentrager
was irrelevant, and the district court could assert jurisdiction over
1 18
their claims

Id. at 67.
110.
Id. (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (stating that "it is
ill.
well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the
United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders")); United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270 (1990).
112.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
113.
Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for
Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.- Cuba, art. III, T.S. 418.
114.

Id.

115.
116.
117.

Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 69 n.14.
Id. at 69.
Id.

118.

Id.
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The petitioners relied on the D.C. District Court case of Ralpho
v. Bell11 9 to support their theory of de facto sovereignty. 120 In Ralpho,
a claim was made under the Micronesian Claims Act of 1971, which
was a statute that established a fund compensating Micronesians for
losses sustained during World War 11.121 The plaintiff in Ralpho
argued that a claims commission created under the Act to adjudicate
settlement claims violated his due process rights because it used
secret evidence when resolving his claim. 122 Although the United
States did not maintain sovereignty over Micronesia, the court
concluded that the plaintiff should receive the protections of the due
process clause. 123 The petitioners in Rasul relied on Ralpho for the
argument that since constitutional protections extended to the
plaintiff in a location where the United States was not sovereign,
those same protections should be extended to aliens who are in places
124
where the United States exercises de facto sovereignty.
The district court pointed out that the petitioners' reliance on
Ralpho was misplaced, since that case only held that aliens who
resided in the sovereign territories of the United States were entitled
to certain constitutional protections. 125 In reaching this conclusion, it
noted that the court in Ralpho quoted a statement made by the U.S.
Representative to the United Nations at a Security Council meeting
to determine whether the United States would have a trusteeship
over Micronesia. 126 The statement said, 'Mygovernment feels that it
has a duty toward the peoples of the Trust Territory to govern them
with no less consideration than it would govern any part of its
sovereign territory.' 1 27 The district court also noted that when the
United States was given a trusteeship over Micronesia, no other
country maintained sovereignty over the territory, and the United
States had "full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction
over the territory subject to the provisions of [the trust]
agreement.' 128 The court interpreted Ralpho as equating Micronesia
with a U.S. territory, such as Puerto Rico or Guam, and extended
29
constitutional protections to the plaintiff on that basis.1

119.
Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
120.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
Id. at 69-70.
125.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 70.
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
128.
Id. (quoting Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated
Islands Approved at the One Hundred and Twenty Fourth Meeting of the Security
Council, July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, art. 3).
129.
Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 70.
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According to the district court, the U.S. military installation at
Guantanamo Bay "was nothing remotely akin to a territory of the
United States, where the United States provides certain rights to the
inhabitants.' u3 0 Instead, it simply constitutes a portion of land the
United States leases in order to operate a naval base. 131 The district
court then pointed to other cases that it believed rejected the idea of
applying a de facto sovereignty test to examine claims arising out of
32
the military base at Guantanamo Bay.'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court, holding that Eisentragerprecluded the
detainees from seeking a writ of habeas corpus in U.S. courts. 1 33 The
court, in Al Odah v. United States, noted that like the German
prisoners in Eisentrager, "[the Guantanamo detainees] are aliens,
they . ..were captured during military operations, they were in a

foreign country when captured, they are now abroad, they are in the
custody of the American military, and they have never had any
presence in the United States.' 1 34 It interpreted Eisentragerto mean
that certain constitutional protections do not extend to aliens located
outside sovereign U.S. territory, irrespective of whether they are
enemy aliens. 135 As did the district court, it stated that later decisions
136
of the Supreme Court reaffirmed this interpretation of Eisentrager.

130.
Id. at 71.
131.
Id.
132.
See id. (citing Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1996); and
Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n, Inc. v. Christopher,43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995), cert denied,
515 U.S. 1142 (1995)).
133.
Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-0334). In addition to affirming
the decision of the district court in Rasul, the court of appeals also dismissed the
petition brought by the wife of an Australian citizen who was detained at Guantanamo
Bay. Id. at 1137.
134.
Id. at 1140.
135.
Specifically, the court of appeals based this interpretation on the following
passage from Eisentrager:
If the Fifth Amendment confers its rights on all the world ... [it] would mean
that during military occupation irreconcilable enemy elements, guerrilla
fighters, and 'werewolves' could require the American judiciary to assure them
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as in our First Amendment, right to
bear arms as in the Second, security against 'unreasonable' searches and
seizures as in the Fourth, as well as rights to jury trial as in the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments."
Id. at 1140 (quoting Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 784).
136.
Id. at 1141. The court of appeals, as did the district court, noted that the
Supreme Court interpreted Eisentrageras rejecting "the claim that aliens are entitled
to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States." Id.
(quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 260 (1990) (holding that
Fourth Amendment protections did not extend to nonresident aliens where searches or
seizures are performed outside sovereign U.S. territory)). Moreover, as did the district
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According to the court, "Eisentrageritself directly tied jurisdiction to
the extension of constitutional provisions ....,,137
Turning its attention to the status of Guantanamo Bay, the court
of appeals relied on the text of the aforementioned Lease agreement
between the United States and Cuba in holding that the naval base is
not within the sovereign territory of the United States. 138 The court
also rejected the argument that U.S. military control over the base
was equivalent to the United States exercising de facto sovereignty
over Guantanamo Bay. 139 Finally, it concluded that the detainees'
causes of action under the Alien Tort Act were also barred under the
140
holding of Eisentrager.
Following the Al Odah decision, the issue of whether the
Guantanamo detainees could seek a writ of habeas corpus in a U.S.
federal court was again considered by the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California in Gherebi v. Bush. 141 In this case, the
brother of a detainee at Guantanamo Bay brought a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus to the district court. 142 Again relying on the
Court's decision in Eisentragerand subsequent interpretations of the

court, the court of appeals discussed how the Supreme Court cited Eisentragerfor the
proposition that it was "well established that certain constitutional protections
available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our
geographic borders." Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678). Finally, the court of
appeals stated that it followed the language about the Fifth Amendment in VerdugoUrquidez, although it was dictum. Id. (discussing Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 604
(D.C. Cir. 2000) rev'd on other grounds sub nom); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403
(2002); Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1960); People's Mojahedin
Org. v. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
137.
Id. at 1141.
138.
Id. at 1142-43. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals
distinguished criminal cases involving activities by both aliens and U.S. citizens at
Guantanamo Bay and noted that those cases "arose under the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction" under 18 U.S.C. § 7. Id. (discussing United States v. Lee, 906
F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)).
139.
Id. at 1143. (discussing Christopher,443 F.3d at 1425 (rejecting notion that
'"control and jurisdiction' is equivalent to sovereignty"); Vermilya-Brown Co. v.
Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948) (holding that U.S. controlled naval base in Cuba pursuant
to lease agreement with Great Britain was not under U.S. sovereignty)).
The court of appeals also rejected the detainees' argument that Eisentrager used
the terms "territorial jurisdiction" and "sovereignty" interchangeably in a manner that
did not attach significance to either term. Id. at 1143-44. Specifically, it stated that
when the Court in Eisentrager discussed "'territorial jurisdiction', it meant the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States courts." Id. at 1143. Sovereignty, however,
referred to "supreme dominion exercised by a nation." Id. at 1143. The court of appeals
therefore concluded: "The United States has sovereignty over the geographic area of
the States and, as the Eisentrager Court recognized, over insular possessions,....
Guantanamo Bay fits within neither category." Id. at 1143-1144.
140.
Id. at 1144.
141.
Gherebi v. Bush, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
142.
Id. at 1065.
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could not
decision, the district court concluded that the detainees
143
seek a writ of habeas corpus in a U.S. federal court.
Interestingly, the district court stated that it "reache[d] this
conclusion reluctantly . . . because the prospect of the Guantanamo

captives' being detained indefinitely without access to counsel,
without formal notice of charges, and without trial is deeply
troubling."'1 44 Statements in other portions of the district court's
opinion could also be interpreted to show the court's reluctance in
reaching the above conclusion. For instance, in its discussion of
whether Guantanamo Bay was within the sovereign territory of the
United States, the district court admitted that the "dispositive
distinction between "sovereign territory" and "complete jurisdiction
and control" may appear technical (or at least elusive), but
Petitioner's arguments provide no principled basis for this Court to
disregard Johnson [v. Eisentrager].''145 Moreover, after commenting

on how reports in the press indicating that some of the detainees are
juveniles "led some to resort to extreme hyperbole in calling for
immediate remedies," the district court ended its opinion with the
following statement: "Unfortunately, unless Johnson [v. Eisentrager]
and the other authorities cited above are either disregarded or
rejected, this Court lacks the power and the right to provide such a
remedy. Perhaps, a higher court will find a principled way to do
so."

146

2. The Courts' Mistaken Reliance on Sovereignty
The courts' reliance on the notion of sovereignty in the above
cases provides a unique example of how a strict reliance on using
specific legal characterizations can often be difficult to defend as an
analytical matter. The courts' decision to characterize whether
specific constitutional protections applied to the Guantanamo

143.
Id. at 1065-72. The district court specifically noted that under Eisentrager,
the detainees could invoke the jurisdiction of any district court only if the United
States maintained sovereignty over the base. Id. at 1067. The district court then relied
on the 1903 lease agreement between the U.S. and Cuba to conclude that Cuba
maintained sovereignty over the base. Id. at 1069-70. In reaching this conclusion, the
district court rejected the argument that U.S. control over the base established
sovereignty. Id. The district court also noted that Eisentrager'sholding was not limited
to only those captured during a formally declared war. Id at 1070. Such a limitation
would ignore the Eisentrager court's concern that providing access to the courts would
"divert [the] efforts and attention [of field commanders] from the military offensive
abroad to the legal defensive at home." Id. (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779).
Moreover, the district court stated that under Eisentrager,it did not matter whether
the detainee was charged or brought before a military commission. Id. at 1071-72.
144.

Id. at 1066.

145.
146.

Id. at 1065-70.
Gherebi, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
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detainees as an issue of sovereignty provided an easy solution to a
seemingly complicated issue. The reliance on sovereignty, however, is
problematic because the concept of sovereignty is ambiguous in and of
itself. The courts' reliance on the issue of sovereignty also overlooked
the realities of the U.S. relationship to Guantanamo Bay.
14 7
Characterizations play an important role in our legal system.
Specifically, characterizations help judges divide the world into
distinct categories through which substantive rules attach.' 48 The
majority of characterizations are successful in capturing relevant
phenomena. 149 In rare cases, however, there are certain phenomena
involving difficult issues that are not amenable to a simple
characterization. 150 In such instances, courts often struggle in
confronting these issues and oftentimes resort to attaching
preexisting characterizations to such phenomena instead of
undertaking a more thorough analysis. 151 The courts' use of
sovereignty provides an example of the difficulties associated with
applying such characterizations to certain phenomena.
In traditional legal theory, attributes of sovereignty included the
power to maintain exclusive jurisdiction over citizens residing in the
state, equality with other states, and the ability to create policies
limited only to the extent that those policies impacted other states or
agreements with other states.' 52 Louis Henkin, however, argues that
53
sovereignty is a confusing term that has a variety of uses.'
Specifically, Henkin notes:
States are commonly described as "sovereign," and "sovereignty" is
commonly noted as an implicit, axiomatic characteristic of statehood.
The pervasiveness of that term is unfortunate, rooted in mistake,
unfortunate mistake. Sovereignty is a bad word, not only because it has
served terrible national mythologies; in international relations, and
even in international law, it is often a catchword, a substitute for
thinking and precision. It means many things, some essential, some
insignificant; some agreed, some controversial; some that are not
154
warranted and should not be accepted.

147.

See generally Thomas R. McCoy, Logic vs. Value Judgment in Legal and

Ethical Thought, 23 VAND. L. REV. 1277 (1970) (discussing the role categorizations play
in grouping phenomena that exist in reality and the difficulties associated with
applying such categorizations to certain phenomena).
148.
See id.
149.
See id.
150.
See id.
151.
See id.

152.
Celia R. Taylor, A Modest Proposal:Statehood and Sovereignty in a Global
Age, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 745, 752 (1997).
153. Louis Henkin, That "S"Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human
Rights, Etcetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1999) (discussing the confusing nature of the
term sovereignty).
154.
Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8 (1995).
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Henkin believes that the confusing nature of sovereignty stems from
its origins. 15 5 Specifically, sovereignty arose out of an international
system where nations and "princedoms" were the primary actors
instead of "states".156 This law of relations between princes was later
assimilated into modern international law. 157 Henkin notes that the
functions attributed to the prince through relations with other
princes and through early international norms "were later attributed
to 'the state.' 1 5 8 As the prince was sovereign at home and carried
that sovereignty into relations with other sovereign princes, the state
also became sovereign at home and likewise carried its sovereignty
into relations with other states. 15 9 Moreover, the sovereignty of the
prince became confused with other aspects of the prince's authority
160
and these were also carried over to the state.
According to Henkin, sovereignty was initially confined as a
domestic term describing domestic relationships. 16 1 It addressed
relations between
the ruler (the sovereign) and the ruled (the
"subjects"). 6 2 Henkin believes that sovereignty should be strictly
defined as "the locus of legitimate authority in a political society, once
the prince or "the Crown," later parliament or the people."'1 63 Henkin
argues against the notion of sovereignty playing a role in influencing
the external relations between states because it was a concept
originating from the relationship between the prince and the prince's
subjects. 164 Therefore, in the realm of international relations, Henkin
argues that sovereignty is an essentially unnecessary concept that
165
should be avoided.
The courts' decision to deny constitutional protections to the
detainees on the grounds that Cuba maintained de jure sovereignty
over Guantanamo Bay does not withstand scrutiny. As discussed
above, sovereignty is a nebulous concept that is susceptible to a
number of meanings. It is therefore problematic to deny
constitutional protections on an adherence to such an ambiguous
notion. The reliance on de jure sovereignty can be best seen as an
escape device by the courts to avoid answering the difficult question
as to whether nonresident aliens detained on a military installation

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id. at 9 (providing a historical discussion on the notion of sovereignty).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Henkin, supra note 153, at 2.
Id.
HENKIN, supra note 154, at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
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over which the United States effectively maintains complete
jurisdiction and control are entitled to constitutional protections.
The courts' insistence on the notion of sovereignty also avoids the
realities of the United States' relationship with the military base at
Guantanamo Bay. The United States maintains complete control over
66
the base and acts on the territory without the permission of Cuba.'
Cuba maintains no control over activities that transpire on
Guantanamo and has no method to maintain such control if it so
desired. 167 One commentator has further elaborated that the United
States does "not need Fidel Castro's permission to do anything
there."'168 Moreover, although the U.S. government successfully
argued that the Constitution does not extend to Guantanamo, it is
highly unlikely that the government would be receptive to a Cuban
assertion of jurisdiction over the detainees and a subsequent
169
application of its laws affecting their current treatment.
Therefore, under the status quo, the Administration has
determined that the suspected terrorist detainees do not qualify as
prisoners of war under the provisions of the Third Geneva
Convention. The detainees also are not entitled to protections under
the U.S. Constitution because Guantanamo Bay is not within the
sovereign territory of the United States. With respect to this issue,
the courts' formalistic methodology heavily relying on notions of
sovereignty, avoided the practical realities of the United States'
relationship with Guantanamo Bay. A more detailed examination of
the Constitution's scope may provide more meaningful insights with
respect to the issue of extending constitutional protections to the
detainees. The next section addresses this issue and describes specific
theories interpreting the scope of constitutional protections.
IV.

THEORIES DESCRIBING THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTION

A more detailed examination of the applicability of extending
U.S. constitutional protections to the Guantanamo detainees requires
an analysis of the Constitution's scope. The Constitution does not

166.
See Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1230
(1996) (noting that Guantanamo Bay constitutes an anomalous zone where
governments often suspend fundamental liberties in response to certain necessities).
167.
Anupam Chander, Guantanamo and the Rule of Law: Why We Should Not
Use Guantanamo Bay to Avoid the Constitution, (Mar. 7, 2002), available at
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20020307_chander.html#bio (last visited
Oct. 10, 2003).
168.
See Henry Weinstein, Prisoners May Face 'Legal Black Hole" L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2002, at A37 (quoting Gerald Neuman, who discusses in the article how
attempts to characterize the issue facing the detainees as one involving sovereignty are
misguided).
169.
Chander, supra note 167.
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specify its geographic or personal scope. 170 The proper scope of the
U.S. Constitution has been a subject of debate throughout U.S.
history. The text of the Constitution has yielded varied readings
regarding its scope. 171 A number of conceptualizations seeking to
172
resolve this issue emerged out of U.S. constitutional history.
Gerald Neuman has noted that these approaches include
universalism, balancing approaches, and social contract based
73
approaches.'
A. Universalism
Under a universalist approach, constitutional protections that
are not expressly limited to persons or places should be interpreted to
extend to all of those persons and places. 1 74 Universalism, however,
does not require identical results irrespective of citizenship or
location. 175 In this regard, the text of the specific constitutional
provisions, especially those providing protections subject to balancing
tests, can vary depending on the location. 176 The argument
advocating a universal interpretation of specific constitutional
provisions may rely on natural rights influences in U.S. constitutional
17 7
history that may find support in current human rights norms.
Alternatively, universalism could be based on a plain textual reading
of the U.S. constitutional provisions where some provisions are
expressly limited to some persons and places whereas others operate
178
to everybody everywhere.
This specific approach to the Constitution would compel the
government to follow the rules of a global regime rooted in universal

170.
Eric Bentley Jr., Toward an InternationalFourth Amendment: Rethinking
Searches and Seizures Abroad After Verdugo-Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 329,
335 (1994).
171.

GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1996).

See id. (discussing four specific approaches emerging from U.S.
172.
constitutional history that addressed the scope of the constitution: universalism,
membership models, mutuality of legal obligation, and global due process).
173.
See id. at 5-8 (discussing the scope of the Constitution, breaking down
social contract theories to include membership models and mutuality approaches).
174.
Id. at 5.
175.
Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, and the
Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1567, 1574 (1997) (providing a review of Gerald
Neuman's work in Strangers to the Constitution).
NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 5 ("The precise commands of the provisions,
176.
especially of those creating rights subject to balancing tests, may vary from place to
place, but one can never simply dismiss the provisions as inapplicable.").
177.
See id. at 5-6 (discussing arguments that could support a universalism
based approach to interpreting the scope of the Constitution).
178.
Id.
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norms. 179 Universalism, however, does not comport with the text and
history of the Constitution.1 80 The Constitution's text and history
shows that it does not serve as a source for universal norms owed to
everyone, but rather that it maintains a more limited role, outlining
specific protections against government actions.18 1 Generally,
universalism had virtually no influence on the development of U.S.
182
constitutional doctrine.
B. Balancing Approaches (Global Due Process)
The balancing approach, otherwise referred to as Global Due
Process, represents another model whereby the application of
constitutional protections extraterritorially is subject to a test where
a court weighs competing interests. 183 Specifically, under Global Due
Process, constitutional protections may have worldwide applicability
so long as articulated government interests do not outweigh those
protections.' 8 4 This approach was employed by Chief Justice Edward
Douglass White during the Insular Cases and later by Justices Felix
Frankfurter and the second Justice Harlan. 185 More recently, the
Global Due Process approach was articulated in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.l8 6 Justice
Kennedy's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez relied to a large extent on
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Reid v. Covert, 8 7 where he stated
that "[tihe proposition is, of course, not that the Constitution 'does not
apply' overseas, but that there are provisions in the Constitution
which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign
place.' 188 Harlan noted that the central line of inquiry when
determining which constitutional protections are to be applied in
specific situations should focus on "what process is 'due' a defendant
in the particular circumstances of a particular case."'189
The Global Due Process approach, however, also presents certain
flaws. For instance, Global Due Process provides unlimited flexibility

179.
See id. at 110 (stating that a universalist approach would "bind the
government to the rules of a just world order").
180.
Motomura, supra note 175, at 1578.
181.
See NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 110 (explaining that universalism as a
method to interpret the Constitution should be rejected because the moral rights it
seeks to apply to everybody everywhere are not stated as moral duties in the
constitution having universal applicability).
182.
Id. at 6.
183.
Id. at 8.
184.

Id.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
See id. at 107-08 (discussing Kennedy's concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez).
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
Id. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring)
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and is not rooted in the text of the Constitution. 190 It has also been
criticized as an approach that "presents more a political compromise
than an elaboration of principle or an act of constitutional
interpretation."' 191

C. Social ContractBased Approaches
Social contract theory represents another approach and has
played an important role in U.S. constitutional history. 192 Under
social contract theory, the government derives its legitimacy through
either an actual or hypothetical agreement that represents the
consent of those individuals who create the state and give it the
authority to govern. 193 The social contract was primarily focused on
the issue of government legitimacy. 194 The notion of government
legitimacy involved two questions. 195 The first question addressed the
manner in which the citizens' duty to obey government laws could
arise. 196 The second question focused on the point at which
government transgressions could relinquish the citizens from
maintaining obedience to the laws. 197 One medieval form of the
theory envisioned a contract of government between the monarch and
the people to be governed that was communicated in an oath or
charter. 198 Central to this theory, however, was the assumption that
individuals could coalesce and create an agreement that was binding
on each of them. 199
Under social contract theory, the obligation for an individual to
obey laws had to be rooted in that individual's actual or implied
consent. 200 Absent the existence of some form of a collective
association, social contract theory presumed that individuals lived in
a "state of nature" without numerous protections that could improve
their security and material well-being.2 0 1 Due to numerous dangers
existing in the "state of nature", individuals coalesced and agreed to
create a governing institution.20 2 This collective agreement

190.
Motomura, supra note 175, at 1578.
191.
NEUMAN, supranote 171, at 116.
192.
Id. at 6.
193.
Id.
194.
Id. at 9.
195.
See id. (discussing the background of the social
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
Id.
200.
Id.
201.
See id. (discussing the background of the social
202.
See id. (noting that some of these concerns
security and material improvement). Moreover, Neuman

contract).

contract).
included obtaining greater
notes that individuals may
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represented the social contract proper and differed from the contract
20 3
between the government and the governed.
Social contract theory left unresolved questions regarding its
personal and geographic scope. These ambiguities provided an
opportunity for alternative explanations to surface addressing the
Constitution's scope. 20 4 Two alternative explanations attempting to
describe the scope of the Constitution arose under the rubric of social
contract theory. These include the membership and mutuality
20 5
approaches.
1. Membership
The membership approach is a restrictive articulation of social
contract theory that narrows the class of beneficiaries under the
contract to specific individuals (members).20 6 Members share specific
rights provided for in the contract, while non-members receive
20 7
whatever rights they possessed independent of the contract.
Moreover, only members could seek redress against the government
for any transgressions. 20 8 Non-members, on the other hand, were
potentially subject to the unconstrained authority of the
government.20 9 One ambiguity in the membership approach related
to the question of who is considered a member. 210 Those who
advocated a restrictive interpretation of membership argued for
211
varying characterizations of who or what constitutes a member.

have collectively agreed to form a governing association "out of an inherent sociability."

Id.
203.
Id. According to Neuman, different authors had varying conceptions
regarding the number and content of the agreements embodying the social contract. Id.
Hobbes, for instance, removed the contract of government. Id. Other writers wanted to
reinstate limits on sovereign power. Id. at 10.
204.
Id.
205.
Id. at 5. Neuman notes that included in the mutuality approach is the
notion of strict territoriality. Under strict territoriality, constitutional limitations only
attach to acts of the U.S. government within its borders. Id. at 7. Neuman argues,
however, that strict territoriality represents "a special case of a more general approach
that focuses on a sphere in which American municipal law operates." Id. This sphere is
not limited to a geographic definition and can be defined in a number of ways. Id. at 78.
206.
Id. at 6.
207.
Id.
208.
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (2002).
209.
Id.
210.
Id. at 21.
211.
NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 6-7. Neuman notes that such characterizations
"may include all the citizens of the nation 'the United States,' the subset consisting of
those who are citizens of the various states, or some intermediate group including
citizens of some, but not all, of the territories." Id. at 7.
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The membership theory has historically played a prominent role
in defining the scope of constitution protections. During the debates
surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, Federalists argued
that constitutional protections extended only to citizens, who
represented the original parties to the social contract. 212 Aliens were
not parties to the contract and therefore had to look to other sources

for

specific

protections. 213 Membership

theories

also played

a

significant role in Justice Taney's decision in the Dred Scott case,
where he concluded that blacks were never a part of "the people" that
214
were afforded constitutional protections.
Additionally, during the second half of the nineteenth century,
state legislatures used membership theories to create schemes that
restricted protections available to aliens that were enjoyed by
citizens. 215 Membership theories also helped the Supreme Court
constrain the geographic scope of the Constitution. 216 For instance,

during the Insular Cases, 2 17 the Court applied the membership

approach in the "incorporated territories" doctrine. 218 This doctrine
was articulated in Downes v. Bidwel1 219 through an opinion written
by Justice Edward Douglass White. 220 Justice White noted that the
Constitution provided full protection to individuals living in
territories that were incorporated into the United States, whereas
those living in territories that were only acquired by the United
States were entitled to specific, fundamental constitutional
221
protections.

212.
Id. at 54-57.
213.
See id. at 54 (explaining, for instance, that the law of nations may have
been one such source, although under the law of nations a country could expel aliens at
will).
214.
Bentley, supra note 170, at 349 (discussing the extraterritorial application
of the Fourth Amendment).
215.
See id. at 349-50 (noting how the California legislature passed measures
that conferred second-class status on Chinese immigrants and how these measures
were later struck down by the Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886), and Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)).
216.
Id. at 350.
217.
Neuman points out that 'This imprecise term refers to both the nine cases
relating to the constitutional and legal status of Puerto Rico and the Philippines
argued in 1901, and to the entire series of cases from DeLima v.Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1
(1901), to Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), that established the framework of
second-class status for overseas territories." NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 83.
218.
See id. at 83 (discussing the Insular Cases).
219.
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
220.
NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 86.
221.
Downes, 182 U.S. at 299 (White, J., joined by Shiras and McKenna, JJ.,
concurring); NEUMAN, supranote 171, at 86-87.
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2. Mutuality
The mutuality approach ties the scope of constitutional
protections to the imposition of government obligations on
individuals. Mutuality serves as an alternative articulation of the
strict territorial model of the U.S. Constitution. 222 Under the strict
territorial model, the U.S. government is constrained by the
Constitution only when it acts inside its borders. 2 23 This theory
originated from the notion of the territorial integrity of sovereign
states. 224 Therefore, strict territoriality held that law had binding
225
effect only within the state that created it.
Strict territoriality can be viewed "as a special case of a more
general approach that focuses on a sphere in which American
municipal law operates. '226 Instead of defining this sphere in
geographic terms, it is possible to define the sphere by using a wider
range of factors. 227 Serving as fundamental municipal law, the
Constitution can also exist within that sphere and provide constraints
on government action. 2 28 Under this approach, government actions
outside the domain of municipal law are not binding upon individuals
and are not subject to the Constitution's constraints on
government. 229 The mutuality approach differs from membership
approaches on the issue of how an individual becomes entitled to the
benefits of the social contract. 230 Under the mutuality approach, full
constitutional protections extend whenever the U.S. government
places legal obligations on an individual requiring his or her
231
obedience.
The theories embodied in the mutuality approach also influenced
the interpretation of the Constitution's personal scope. During the
debate over the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, Jeffersonian
Republicans used mutuality theories to argue against a membership

222.
See NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 7 (discussing how the strictly territorial
approach constitutes a specific instance of a more general model that focuses on
spheres through which U.S. domestic law operates).
223.
Id.
224.
Id.
225.
Id.
226.
Id. Neuman notes that municipal law is another word for a nation-state's
domestic law. Specifically, he states "the term municipal law is used here in accordance
with its use by writers on international law to designate the law of a given nationstate, in opposition to international or natural law."
227.
Id. at 8.
228.
Id.
229.
Id.
230.
Id.
231.
Id. at 99-100. Neuman points out, however, that under the mutuality
approach, certain provisions of the Constitution may apply more narrowly in light of
textual or structural arguments.
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view of the Constitution.2 32 The Jeffersonian Republicans argued that
aliens submitted themselves to the legal authority of the government
when they entered the country and therefore constitutional
protections should extend to these individuals. 233 Mutuality played a
significant role in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2 34 where the Supreme Court
clearly stated that aliens possessed rights inside the territory of the
23 5
United States.
Initially, more restrictive aspects of mutuality, represented in
the notion of strict territoriality, governed the Court's interpretation
of the Constitution's geographic scope.2 3 6 The strict territoriality
version of the mutuality approach was at the center of the Court's
decision in In re Ross, 23 7 where a U.S. seaman tried by a U.S. consul
in Japan argued that he was denied specific constitutional
protections, such as the right to an indictment by a grand jury and
jury trial. 238 The Court rejected those claims and noted that the
Constitution only operates within the United States and is without
effect in foreign countries. 2 3 9 However, the strict territoriality
approach was later repudiated in Reid v. Covert,240 a case where the
wives of two servicemen were charged with murdering their
2 41
husbands on U.S. military installations in England and Japan.
Justice Black, writing for the plurality of four, concluded that the
protections of the Constitution extend to U.S. citizens abroad and
noted:
At the beginning we reject the idea that when the United States acts
against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The United
States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and
authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all
the limitations imposed by the Constitution. When the Government
reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill

232.
See id. at 57-60 (discussing the Jeffersonian Republicans' mutuality based
arguments with respect to the interpretation of the Constitution's scope).
233.
Id. at 60.
234.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 356 (1886).
235.
See Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience:
Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 16 (1985)
(noting that the Yick Wo decision "confirmed that the Constitution, including the equal
protection clause, protects aliens"). Henkin also adds that the case "assured the
constitutional rights of resident aliens in the United States against the states, and
against the United States." Id. at 18. In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court specifically
concluded that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment are not solely limited to
citizens, but that they are rather universal protections applicable to any person living
inside the territory of the United States. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369.
236.
See NEUMAN, supranote 171, at 73.
237.
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
238.
Id. at 454-58; NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 82.
239.
In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 464; NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 82.
240.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1957).
241.
Id. at 3-4; NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 89.
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of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life
and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be
24 2
in another land.

It is important to note that the Court in Reid was silent on the issue

of whether the Constitution operated extraterritorially to aliens.
Generally, U.S. constitutional history has yielded four distinct
theories attempting to interpret the scope of the protections listed in
the Constitution. Approaches rooted in universalism view the
Constitution as a source that embodies a set of global norms
applicable to all persons everywhere. Balancing approaches such as
Global Due Process apply a balancing test that weighs the necessity
of providing constitutional protections against articulated
government interests. Both of these approaches, however, have not
played a significant role in the debate over the appropriate scope of
the Constitution. The debate over the Constitution's scope has
primarily occurred between advocates of the membership and
mutuality approaches. This debate continues today and is highlighted
in the Supreme Court's decision in the case of United States v.
24 3
Verdugo- Urquidez.
D. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: The Court Draws the Battle
Lines Over the ExtraterritorialScope of the Constitution
The Supreme Court case of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez244
represents an instance where members of the Court took contrasting
positions over whether a membership theory or a mutuality based
approach should be employed when determining the proper scope of
the Constitution. 245 The membership theory guided Chief Justice
William Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, whereas the mutuality
2 46
approach influenced Justices Brennan's dissent.
Verdugo-Urquidez was a Mexican citizen who was thought to be
the leader of a Mexican organization that smuggled narcotics into the

242.
Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6.
243.
Verdugo-Urquidez,494 U.S. at 259.
244.
Id.
245.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion also employed the Global Due Process
approach. The following discussion will focus on the membership and mutuality
approaches. For further discussion of the Global Due Process approach, see supra
Section B.
246.
See NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 104-08 (discussing the Justices' opinions in
Verdugo-Urquidez). Neuman also states that Justice Blackmun's dissent "aligned itself
with Brennan's mutuality of obligation argument," although it differed with respect to
the scope of mutuality in certain situations. Id. at 108. Specifically, Justice Blackmun
stated that he did not agree "that the Fourth Amendment governs every action by an
American official that can be characterized as a search or seizure. American agents
acting abroad generally do not purport to exercise sovereign authority over the foreign
nationals with whom they come in contact." Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 297
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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United States. 247 In 1986, he was apprehended by Mexican police
officers and transported to a U.S. Border Patrol station in California
where he was then arrested. 248 While he was incarcerated in the
United States, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency acting with the
cooperation of Mexican authorities searched Verdugo-Urquidez's
Mexican properties in Mexicali and San Felipe, where they found
documents detailing his drug smuggling activities. 24 9 The district
court suppressed the evidence, concluding that the searches violated
the Fourth Amendment. 2 50 A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed. 25 1 In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
25 2
searches of a nonresident alien's property in another country.
The Chief Justice's analysis began with a textual argument
focused on the phrase "the people." 253 He noted that the phrase "the
people" is "a term of art" used in specific sections of the Constitution
and "refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community
or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community. ' 254 VerdugoUrquidez, Rehnquist, stated, was not entitled to Fourth Amendment
protections because "he was a citizen and resident of Mexico with no
voluntary attachment to the United States, and the place searched
was located in Mexico." 25 5 After concluding that the history
surrounding the drafting of the Fourth Amendment suggested that
its protections were only to operate within the United States,
Rehnquist noted that the Fourth Amendment did not constrain U.S.
seizures of French ships during an "undeclared war" with France in
the late eighteenth century. 256 Rehnquist next discussed the Court's
precedent and argued that the Court has never held that aliens were
provided with constitutional protections against U.S. actions
overseas. 257 He further noted that the reliance Verdugo-Urquidez

247.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262.
248.
Id.
249.
Id. at 262-63.
250.
Id.
251.
Id.
252.
Id. at 261; NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 105.
253.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
254.
Id. at 265.
255.
Id. at 274-75.
256.
Id. at 266-68.
257.
See NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 105-06 (providing a summary of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez). In his Verdugo-Urquidez opinion,
the Chief Justice stated that the Insular Cases "held that not every constitutional
provision applies to government activity even where the United States has sovereign
power." Verdugo- Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268. Central to this conclusion was the doctrine
of "incorporated" territories where in territories that are only acquired by the United
States, the full protections of the Constitution do not have to necessarily apply to
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placed on Reid to support the notion that the Fourth Amendment
applied to the government's actions in this case was misplaced,
because Reid only stood for the proposition that U.S. citizens abroad
could assert the protections contained in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. 25 8 Because Verdugo-Urquidez was not a citizen,
259
Rehnquist concluded that Reid was inapposite.
Finally, Rehnquist concluded his opinion by stating that a
decision to extend Fourth Amendment protections to aliens such as
Verdugo-Urquidez
would
have
"significant and
deleterious
260
consequences" for the U.S. with respect to its acts overseas.
Specifically, the Fourth Amendment would not only apply to
extraterritorial law enforcement operations, but also to other military
operations and could subsequently undermine the capacity of the
political branches to address foreign policy issues that affect the
national interest.2 61 Moreover, Rehnquist argued that the
extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment would force the
political branches "into a sea of uncertainty as to what might be
'26 2
reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted abroad.
Justice Brennan's dissent emphasized an alternative view of the
Constitution and advocated the mutuality approach. 263 Justice
Brennan criticized the majority's conclusion that Verdugo-Urquidez
was not of "the people" that receive Fourth Amendment protections
because it "disregarded basic notions of mutuality."2 64 Brennan
stated that the mutuality approach mandated that whenever the
government placed legal obligations on aliens abroad, it had to
correspondingly act on such aliens within the constraints of the
Constitution. 265 He further elaborated that under notions of
mutuality, "[i]f we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be
able to expect that we will obey our Constitution when we investigate,

government action. Id. Drawing from this discussion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that if the full level of constitutional protections are not necessarily
applicable in territories governed by the United States, then the argument that those
same protections should extend to aliens abroad is on even weaker ground. Id.
Rehnquist then went on to state that "it is not open to us in light of the Insular Cases
to endorse the view that every constitutional provision applies wherever the United
States Government exercises its power." Id. at 268-69. He pointed out that under
Eisentrager, for instance, aliens are not entitled to the protections of the Fifth
Amendment when they are located outside U.S. sovereign territory. Id. at 269.
258.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269-70.
259.
Id. at 270.
260.
Id. at 273.
261.
Id. at 273-74.
262.
Id. at 274.
263.
See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (outlining
the requirements of the mutuality approach); NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 107
(discussing Brennan's opinion in Verdugo- Urquidez).
264.
Verdugo-Urquidez,494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
265.
Id.
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prosecute, and punish them. '266 Therefore, Brennan concluded that
Verdugo-Urquidez was entitled to Fourth Amendment protections
because the U.S. government imposed obligations on him under
26 7
domestic criminal law.
E. Criticismsof the Membership and Mutuality Approaches
Criticisms leveled against the membership approach focus on its
restrictive nature. Chief Justice Rehnquist's formulation of the
membership approach is embodied in his "substantial connection" test
in Verdugo-Urquidez, where the members included under the
Constitution are essentially limited to citizens and aliens who have
become part of the national community.2 68 One problem with this
formulation is that it ignores certain historical developments. For
instance, foreign aliens were given an opportunity to collect debts in
U.S. courts through foreign diversity jurisdiction outlined in Article
III of the Constitution. 269 Additionally, one commentator noted that
as a historical matter, U.S. courts have not considered foreign
defendants who are involuntarily brought into the country as enemies
who can be dealt with without constitutional constraint. 270 Another
more fundamental problem with the restrictive formulation of the
membership approach is that it simply leaves non-members who are
subject to U.S. government actions without any constitutional
27 1
protection.
The mutuality approach, on the other hand, has received
criticism for its relative ambiguity and also for its broad applicability.
Under the mutuality approach, all constitutional protections should
apply whenever the government imposes legal obligations upon an

Id.
266.
267.
See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284 ("[Verdugo-Urquidez] is entitled to
the protections of the Fourth Amendment because our Government, by investigating
him and attempting to hold him accountable under United States criminal laws, has
treated him as a member of our community for purposes of enforcing our laws. He has
become, quite literally, one of the governed.").
268.
Id. at 265.
269.
Bentley, supra note 170, at 347.
270.
See NEUMAN, supra note 171, at 113 (stating that U.S courts have
"generally assumed that their authority over such defendants must be exercised within
the bounds of constitutional constraint, including the constitutional rights that govern
trial procedure, and that the substance of the criminal statutes said to have been
violated abroad is subject to judicial review").
271.
See id. at 112 (arguing that if restrictive membership claims asserting that
aliens lack constitutional protections overseas are taken at face value, "then it would
seem to follow that there are no constitutional limits on the content of the laws to
which they may be subjected, at least so long as the imposition of sanctions does not
take place within the United States").
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alien. 272 One specific criticism of this approach has focused on the
difficulty in determining what constitutes legal obligations imposed
by the government and if such obligations are imposed on aliens, to
what degree can aliens assert constitutional protections. 273 This line
of criticism generally concludes that there is little difference between
the mutuality approach and the global due process and universalism
theories. 2 74 Another criticism raises the potential problem associated
with the mutuality approach's tendency to attach all constitutional
protections to government-imposed obligations on individuals. 2 75 The
criticism is specifically directed at the fact that such broad based
extension of constitutional protections may undermine national
security concerns and the ability of the political branches to
276
effectively carry out their delegated powers.
V.

APPLYING A REVITALIZED MEMBERSHIP APPROACH TO THE

DETAINEES

Under restrictive conceptions of the membership approach
embodied in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez,
it is almost certain that the al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees at
Guantanamo Bay would not receive constitutional protections. The
Guantanamo detainees are not U.S. citizens. 2 77 Most of the detainees
were captured during the military campaign in Afghanistan.
Applying these circumstances to Rehnquist's "substantial connection"
test, it is unlikely that the Guantanamo detainees are part of the
national community or had substantial voluntary connections to the
United States. Moreover, as Rehnquist noted in his VerdugoUrquidez opinion, considerations with respect to the detainees
implicating the national interest and national security may support
judicial deference to the institutional expertise of the political
branches. 278 Therefore, for advocates of the restrictive formulation of

272.
Id. at 99.
273.
See Motomura, supra note 175, at 1578-81 (outlining flaws in the mutuality
of obligation theory).
274.
Id.
275.
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273-75 (1990) (noting
the consequences of extending all of the protections listed in the Fourth Amendment
abroad); Bentley, supra note 170, at 358-59 (noting Chief Justice Rehnquist's trouble
with the impact Justice Brennan's mutuality approach in Verdugo-Urquidez would
have on U.S. sovereignty abroad).
276.
Bentley, supranote 170, at 358-59.
277.
Jess Bravin, Hearing on 'American Taliban' Is Scheduled to Begin Today,
WALL ST. J, July 15, 2002, at B8.
278.
See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273-75 (explaining that extending the
entire scope of Fourth Amendment protections abroad would have "significant and
deleterious consequences for the United States in conducting activities beyond its
boundaries").
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the membership theory, it would be difficult to justify extending
membership to this specific group of aliens.
Although Rehnquist's application of the "substantial connection"
test and reliance on the judgment of the political branches represents
a restrictive interpretation of the membership theory, it is not
necessary for membership to be so narrowly limited. 279 One
commentator has noted that a restrictive interpretation of the
membership approach stems from constitutional interpretation that
focuses on the rights of aliens. 28 0 A restrictive membership model
that focuses on aliens' rights, however, easily allows the
characterization of aliens not residing in the United States as nonmembers. 28 ' Therefore, a broader conceptualization of the
membership approach may be more helpful in assessing how to
28 2
interpret the Constitution's scope.
One theory that broadens traditional notions of membership
shifts the emphasis to the position of members in the constitutional
structure. 28 3 This theory, otherwise known as the textured
membership theory,28 4 focuses on how government actions against
nonmembers affect those individuals that already maintain a place in
the constitutional scheme.2 8 5 This broader conceptualization of
membership asserts that members are not only interested in their
own constitutional protections, but are often interested in providing
constitutional protections to certain nonmembers. 28 6 Nonmembers
are therefore entitled to constitutional protections to the extent
necessary for members to attain their own objectives within the

constitutional structure. 28 7 Fundamentally, the textured membership

279.
Here I rely on the work of Hiroshi Motomura who argues for a broader
conception of the membership theory that can be embodied in a textured membership
model in the field of immigration law. See generally Motomura, supra note 175.
Although, Motomura's analysis is confined to the realm of immigration law, I argue
that this method of constitutional interpretation can serve as a useful guide in
approaching general questions that address the scope of the Constitution. See id. at
1571.
280.
Id. at 1582.
281.
See id. ("[A] restrictive version of the membership model is a consequence of
a perspective on constitutional immigration law that focuses primarily on aliens'
rights. From that perspective, a model that instead first asks "who is a member?" is
easily interpreted as a model that completely excludes nonmembers, or aliens.").
282.
Id.
283.
See id. at 1582-87 (stating that under a "textured membership model" the
primary concern is placed on the position of the members).
284.
Id. at 1582.
285.
Id. In a footnote, Motomura leaves open the possibility that members can
be defined more broadly to include not only citizens, but also permanent residents. Id.
at 1582 n.37.
286.
Id.
287.
Id. Motomura further elaborates on this point and also offers an example:
"A textured membership model expresses the idea that we should define a
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model is concerned with the notion of national self-definition, or in
other words, the process through which Americans shape their future
288
as a nation.
The textured membership approach avoids the fundamental
difficulty associated with the restrictive membership model. It would
not completely exclude constitutional protections from the detainees
simply on the basis that they are non-members. Rather, the textured
membership approach compels a more substantive inquiry into how
government actions leveled against the detainees affect the degree to
which members receive constitutional protections. If such actions
against non-members were likely to risk further transgressions of the
to members, then those actions
constitutional protections afforded
289
would warrant judicial review.
In making a determination to subject government actions
against non-members to judicial review, consideration must be given
to the potential that unconstrained U.S. government action against
the detainees at Guantanamo Bay will create a precedent allowing
the government to undermine the protections enjoyed by members
residing within the United States. 290 Indeed, events from our nation's
history have shown that withholding constitutional protections to
aliens served as a stepping stone for government transgressions of
citizens' liberties. 291 The internment of people of Japanese descent
during World War II, for instance, was predicated on the theory that
individuals maintaining ties to a country that the United States was
fighting should be detained, because those aliens are generally
disloyal to the country and constitute enemies to the United
States. 292 This theory, however, also served as the basis during the
war to extend internment to those Japanese who had U.S.
citizenship. 293 Similarly, government transgressions aimed at aliens

constitutional place for aliens - often quite generously - by applying principles for the
benefit of citizens. Thus, because we do not wish to endorse racial discrimination, we do
not practice it in immigration law and policy." Id. at 1582-83.
288.
Id. It is important to note that Motomura discusses immigration decisions
involving the selection of "whom to admit and expel" and questions involving an alien's
"transition from outsider to citizen" as choices that affect Americans' national future.
Id. at 1582. Similarly, it could be argued that decisions involving the scope of
constitutional protections in other contexts also affect our national future. For further
discussion outlining a model of national self-definition, see generally Hiroshi
Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of ConstitutionalImmigration Law, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1927 (1996).
Motomura, supra note 288, at 1945.
289.
290.
See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 957 (suggesting that
constitutional protections withheld from aliens may create a precedent to undermine
similar protections enjoyed by citizens).
291.
See id. at 989 (explaining how measures restricting the individual liberties
of immigrants, often provided a basis to institute deprivations of citizen liberties).
292.
Id. at 990.
See id. at 990-91 (pointing out that the U.S. Army defended internment of
293.
Japanese-Americans on the theory that although persons of Japanese descent were
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accused of associating with disfavored political groups deemed to pose
a threat to national security were later extended to citizens. 29 4 These
historical examples underline the tendency of the government to
move from a system where guilt is based on criminal conduct to a
regime where guilt is determined by association.2 95 This transition is
easily facilitated when the government's action is directed against a
particular minority, because people in the majority generally know
296
that they will not find themselves in the minority group.
Past history may already have begun to repeat itself in the post
September 11 environment, as a number of individuals within the
United States, many of whom constitute members, have experienced
an infringement of their constitutional liberties. Even before the
United States began transporting detainees to Guantanamo Bay,
aliens inside the country lost certain constitutional protections
following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act. 297 Additionally, a
large number of aliens have been subject to secret preventative
detention at the hands of the government. 298 For instance, in the
months following the attacks of September 11, twelve thousand
immigrants, who were mostly Muslims, were detained. 299 Moreover,
public attitudes about the use of ethnic profiling as a method to
capture suspected terrorists has become more favorable following the
attacks of September 11.300 A draft bill, referred to as "Patriot Act I"
contemplates extending the denial of certain constitutional
protections to specific citizens. 30 1 One provision, for instance,

technically U.S. citizens, they still constituted "enemy aliens" who were most likely
loyal to Japan). Cole also notes that Lt. John L. DeWitt, who was influential in issuing
the internment orders, suggested that internment of Japanese-Americans was justified
on the basis of their race writing that "[t]he Japanese race is an enemy race and while
many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of
United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized,' the racial strains are
undiluted." Id. at 990.
294.
See id. at 994-97 (showing how government activities aimed at
undermining the liberties of aliens associated with Communists later broadened to
include U.S. citizens during the McCarthy era).
295.
Id. at 997.
296.
See id. at 992 (noting how this transition was easily made with respect to
government action against Japanese-Americans).
297.
See id. at 966 (discussing how the USA PATRIOT Act "makes noncitizens
deportable for wholly innocent associational activity, excludable for pure speech, and
detainable on the Attorney General's say-so, without a hearing and without a finding
that they pose a danger or a flight risk"). Cole also states that the Act allows the
government to avoid normal Fourth Amendment requirements with respect to searches
and wiretaps. Id. at 972-74.
298.
Id. at 960.
299.
A Question of Freedom, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 2003, at 30.
300.
Cole, supranote 290, at 974.
301.
SeeA Question of Freedom, supra note 299, at 29-31 (discussing how recent
actions by the Bush Administration have undermined certain civil liberties).
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provides the government the power to remove citizenship from any
American suspected of providing "material support" to an
organization that is designated as being terrorist and to subsequently
30 2
detain or deport that person without trial.
Consideration, however, must also be given to the importance of
maintaining security when determining whether the judiciary should
oversee the legality of government actions. Certainly terrorism
represents a unique threat that this country has not had much
experience addressing and therefore there may be compelling reasons
to withhold some or even all constitutional safeguards from the
Guantanamo detainees. During times of great anxiety, the balance
between liberty and security has often been struck in favor of
promoting the latter. When the government acts unconstrained by
the Constitution against individuals such as the Guantanamo
detainees, it is dangerous to just presume that the security interests
of the nation outweigh countervailing interests shared by members in
maintaining the protections provided for under the Constitution.
Because such actions against non-members pose a substantial risk to
the interests members possess in maintaining their constitutional
protections, the judiciary should at least entertain claims to observe
the legality of the government's action.
The results derived from an inquiry guided by the textured
membership theory do not necessarily have to lead to the wholesale
application or denial of constitutional protections with respect to the
suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay. It may be the case that only
a certain level of constitutional protection should be afforded to such
individuals. There may even be compelling reasons to deny
constitutional protections to terrorist suspects. Nevertheless, because
unconstrained government actions against non-members may pose a
significant risk to the constitutional protections enjoyed by members,
it is necessary that the judiciary step in and evaluate the legality of
those actions.
VI. CONCLUSION

The suspected terrorist detainees at Guantanamo Bay are
caught in a unique situation where they generally fail to receive the
protections provided by the two primary legal regimes governing their
status. Although the United States has extended the protections
embodied in the Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban detainees
held at Guantanamo Bay, Taliban detainees are not entitled to
prisoner-of-war status. The United States has maintained that the alQaeda detainees will not receive the protections of the Third Geneva

302.

Id. at 31.
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Convention and are therefore ineligible to receive prisoner-of-war
status. Moreover, some federal courts have ruled that the suspected
terrorist detainees cannot challenge their detentions under the
Constitution because Guantanamo Bay is not within the sovereign
territory of the United States.
The situation of the detainees presents difficult questions about
how to define their constitutional status. Such questions, however,
cannot be adequately answered by employing formalistic analysis
that characterizes the issue as one governed by the notion of
sovereignty. Rather, a more thorough approach is warranted that
examines the various theories attempting to interpret the nature of
the Constitution's scope. The textured membership theory represents
a unique approach that breaks away from the restrictive aspects of its
more traditional counterpart. This theory examines the scope of
constitutional protections through a focus on the member, instead of
the alien. Considerations addressing both the members' interest in
maintaining their constitutional protections and the government's
interest in improving security must be evaluated when determining
whether government action against nonmembers warrants judicial
scrutiny. Interpreting the scope of constitutional protections through
the textured membership theory also helps us as Americans focus on
our national self-definition. This notion of self-definition is an
important tool that allows our country to send a powerful message to
the world about how we, as Americans, live in a country governed by
the rule of law embodied in the provisions of our Constitution.
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